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Abstract: This paper builds a model that examines firm heterogeneity across two 
dimensions: productivity and quality. We show that when firms are able to choose their 
input quality and there exists a negative relationship between a firm's product quality 
and their marginal cost, this can lead to a non-unimodal distribution of quality across 
firms. Trade liberalization, represented by reductions in trade costs, and stronger 
vertical linkages, represented by an increase in the cost share of intermediate goods, 
shift the distribution of firms towards the modes of the distribution, which we call quality 
polarization. With this approach, we are able to explain empirical trade patterns relating 
to firm size, prices, and quality of exported goods. 
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Based on the increasing availability of firm-level data, the new trade litera-
ture has documented substantial firm heterogeneity in export performance.
Exporting firms are more profitable than non-exporters, have a larger mar-
ket share, and enter more markets.1 The Melitz (2003) model provides a
theoretical framework for these stylized facts. Firms enter a market with
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and draw their productivity from a
common distribution. Facing fixed entry cost and production costs, firms
surpassing a productivity threshold survive in the domestic market. When
export costs are present, only the more productive firms will find it profitable
to export. Reducing trade costs allows new entrants in the export market
and increases competition in the domestic market, forcing the least produc-
tive firms out of the market and reallocating market share towards the more
productive firms.
Recent empirical literature has revealed a price puzzle: there is no con-
clusive evidence whether exporting firms charge higher or lower prices than
non-exporters. Studies by Roberts and Supina (1996), Roberts and Supina
(2000), and Syverson (2007) report a negative correlation between output
price and firm size. This correlation is predicted by the Melitz (2003) trade
model of heterogeneous firms. The higher a firm’s productivity the lower its
marginal cost. Therefore, more productive firms charge a lower price, produce
more output and export to foreign markets. In contrast to these findings,
recent empirical work by Verhoogen (2008), Iacovone and Javorcik (2008),
Manova and Zhang (2011), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and Crozet et al.
(2012) show that exporters charge higher prices, have larger market shares
and pay higher input prices. To account for these findings, economists have
incorporated quality heterogeneity across firms into the Melitz (2003) model.2
In these models, firms with higher productivity choose to use more expen-
sive, higher-quality inputs to produce high-quality goods. Consumer demand
for quality allows these firms to charge a higher price so that they are more
profitable than firms producing lower-quality goods.
Models incorporating quality sorting predict the positive correlation be-
tween prices and firm size reported in some sectors, while models with only
1See Eaton et al. (2004), Eaton et al. (2008), and Bernard et al. (2011) for a review of
the literature. Manova and Zhang (2011) also provide stylized facts on Chinese exporters.
2See Verhoogen (2008), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Dinopoulos and Unel (2011),
and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012).
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productivity heterogeneity predict the negative correlation between prices
and firm size reported in other sectors. Antoniades (2015) addresses this by
allowing for sector-specific variation in the scope for quality differentiation.
In sectors with a higher scope of quality differentiation, firms with high pro-
ductivity choose to produce high-quality goods and therefore prices increase
with firm size.
Besides these cross-sectoral variations, Antoniades (2015) follows the ex-
isting quality heterogeneous firm literature and assumes that firms produc-
ing either high or low quality are the most profitable within a single sector.
Therefore, the quality of traded goods is predicted to be unimodally dis-
tributed around high or low quality levels. In Section 2 we draw from a rich
data set (U.S. import data from fifty-six countries in 1990, 2000, and 2005),
collected and aggregated by Amiti and Khandelwal (2013), and show that
the quality of goods exported to the U.S. appears to follow a non-unimodal
distribution in 14 out of the 25 sectors (HS 6-digit classification level) with
over 1,000 observations. This evidence suggests that firms within a sector
may find it profitable to export different quality levels and therefore the
correlation between price and market size would be ambiguous.
Section 3 describes our model. There is an intermediate input sector that
produces inputs with two discrete quality levels under perfect competition
with labor being the only factor of production. In the final goods sector,
there is a continuum of firms that produce under monopolistic competition.
Physical output is generated using a a Cobb-Douglas production function
with labor and the intermediate input as the input factors of production.
We address our findings from the data analysis by extending the standard
heterogeneous firms trade model by incorporating endogenous quality choice
of an intermediate input and assuming quality complementarity between a
firm’s capability and their choice of intermediate input quality.3 Standard
heterogeneous firms models with endogenous quality choice emphasize the
substitutability of input quality and firm productivity. We assume the rep-
resentative consumer values the quality of the final good by the lowest qual-
ity component. Therefore, output quality is determined in a Leontief-type
production function with the quality of an intermediate good and a firm spe-
3We follow the ideas of Kremer (1993) who developed the O-ring theory with the story
of the space shuttle Challenger in mind. The shuttle was destroyed due to the failure of
a single, low-cost rubber O-ring. While the model by Kremer (1993) is focused on the
quality of individual workers’ tasks, we directly determine the output quality of a final
good in a Leontief-type production function using similar reasoning.
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cific quality parameter that can be interpreted as the quality of the firm’s
blueprint, design, self-produced parts, etc. The firm specific quality parame-
ter (referred to as capability) is randomly drawn from a common distribution
and is assumed to be positively correlated with the firm’s marginal cost in-
dicating that higher quality is costly.
Firms are sorted along the quality axis, but firm profits are bimodally dis-
tributed due to three effects: First, higher quality firms have higher marginal
cost through two channels: production costs are assumed to increase with
the firm specific quality parameter and firms with higher quality are more
likely to purchase more expensive, higher quality inputs. Second, firms are
able to charge a higher price for higher output quality due to a positive de-
mand for quality. Output quality increases with firm capability until the
firm specific quality parameter surpasses the quality of intermediate inputs,
then, output quality stagnates at the quality level of the intermediate input.
The combination of both effects leads to firm profits initially increasing with
capability until output quality stagnates due to perfect quality complemen-
tarity where profits decline with capability since marginal cost increase while
output prices do not. And third, above an endogenous threshold level, firms
find it profitable to switch from the low-quality to the high-quality interme-
diate input where profits once again increase with capability. The final result
is a bimodal profit distribution where low- and high-quality firms may find
it profitable to export.
We find that the shape of this distribution is determined by the intensity
of consumers’ desire for quality, the strength of vertical linkages within a
sector, the price of the high-quality intermediate input relative to the low-
quality input, and the relationship between firm capability and marginal
cost. Our model can explain the findings in Hallak and Schott (2011) that
the level of quality produced by a country is linked to on its level of income.
Furthermore, we find this effect to be stronger in sectors that exhibit stronger
vertical linkages.
In Section 4, we extend our model and examine trade between two sym-
metric economies to analyze the role of a reduction in trade costs. Like Foster
et al. (2008), we find that firms displace less profitable but not necessarily less
productive or lower quality businesses. Trade liberalization leads to quality
polarization, a reallocation of market share and resources towards the modes
of the profit distribution. An important result of our model is that it may
explain why evidence on the correlation between price and market share of
traded goods are inconsistent across many sectors, as well as the existence
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of non-unimodal distributions of export quality that we first illustrate in the
next section. Introducing quality complementarity between firm capability
and discrete input quality in a heterogeneous firms trade model may help to
explain international patterns of trade. We conclude this paper in Section 5
with final remarks.
2 Data Analysis
In order to examine the distribution of quality across a sector, we use a sample
of 10,000 products across fifty-six countries collected and aggregated by Amiti
and Khandelwal (2013). They used U.S import data from 1990, 2000 and
2005 at the HS 10-digit level and estimated the quality of each product
exported to the U.S. by using both price and quantity information. Higher
quality is assigned to products with higher market shares conditional on price.
Many studies only use price data to infer product quality, but Khandelwal
(2010) finds that prices are not always a good proxy for quality. An advantage
of the standard disaggregate trade data used is that the sector-specific quality
measure, that is otherwise unobserved, is derived by product market shares.
Additionally to the trims of the data by Amiti and Khandelwal (2013),4 we
combine the product data at the HS 6-digit level to highlight the distribution
of quality at the sectoral level. Furthermore, we analyze only sectors with
more than 1,000 observations.
The resulting data shows the product quality of exported goods to the
U.S. for 25 sectors. Plotting a kernel density of quality for each sector,
we find that a majority of the 25 sectors feature a wide range of quality
differences with its distribution tending to be non-unimodal, as shown in
Figure 1. We run Hartigans’ dip test to statistically test the null hypothesis
that the distribution of quality is unimodal. With p-values of less than 0.05,
we reject the null hypothesis that the quality distribution in that sector is
unimodal in 14 of the 25 sectors. The dip test results are shown in Table 1.
These results contradict the models by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) that assume a unimodal quality distribution.
4The authors dropped variety-year observations above or below the 1st and 99th per-
centile of unit values, excluded varieties with annual price increases of more than 200
percent or price declines of more than 66 percent, and dropped varieties with export
quantities of fewer than ten. They also trimmed the quality estimates at the 5th and 95th
percentiles, respectively.
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Table 1: Dip test results
HS6 Description Dip Statistic p-value
420292 Cases and containers 0.0089 0.6905
490199 Books, brochures, leaflets, etc. 0.0747 0.0000*
610910 T-shirts, singlets, etc.; of cotton 0.0222 0.0000*
610990 T-shirts, singlets, etc.; of textile 0.0148 0.0564
611020 Jerseys, pullovers, etc.; of cotton 0.0177 0.0027*
611030 Jerseys, pullovers, etc.; of fibres 0.0143 0.0296*
611120 Garments and accessories 0.0074 0.9631
620342 Trousers, etc.; men’s, of cotton 0.0276 0.0000*
620343 Trousers, etc.; men’s, of synthetic 0.0189 0.0156*
620462 Trousers, etc.; women’s, of cotton 0.0307 0.0000*
620469 Trousers, etc.; women’s, of textile 0.0543 0.0000*
620520 Shirts; men’s or boys’, of cotton 0.0352 0.0000*
630231 Bed linen; of cotton 0.0162 0.0621
640299 Footwear; no. 6402, (other) 0.0127 0.1346
640391 Footwear; no. 6403, covering ankle 0.0399 0.0000*
640399 Footwear; no. 6403, (other) 0.0171 0.0008*
640419 Footwear; (other than sportswear) 0.0046 0.9970
650590 Hats and other headgear 0.0062 0.9505
691110 Household and toilet articles 0.0078 0.9768
691200 Ceramic tableware, etc. 0.0141 0.1900
731210 Iron or steel; stranded wire, etc. 0.0095 0.7669
731700 Iron or steel; nails, tacks, etc. 0.0189 0.0132*
731815 Iron or steel; threaded screws, etc. 0.0070 0.9751
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar 0.0197 0.0000*
910211 Wrist-watches; electrically operated 0.0221 0.0000*
Report of the dip tests result for each sector at the HS 6-digits level.
The second row reports the dip statistic value. The third column
shows the corresponding p-value. The asterisks (∗) represent that the
p-value is less than 0.05, so that we reject the null hypothesis that the
distribution of quality in that sector is unimodal.
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The graph shows the kernel density distribution of product quality in the HS 6-digit
sector ”Women’s or girls trousers, overalls, and shorts” exported to the U.S.. Quality is
distributed around the 0-value, describing average product quality in the sector. Negative
values represent below-average and positive values represent above-average quality levels.
Products exported to the U.S. show a wide variety of quality levels that often
show higher densities in different quality ranges. In other words, firms that
export goods to the U.S. are not necessarily the ones that produce the highest
quality.5 We therefore present a new model in which plant productivity and
input quality are complements in generating output quality, conceptually
following the O-ring theory of Kremer (1993). With this new extension of
the standard heterogeneous firm models, we are able to explain empirical
trade patterns as it relates to the product quality of exported goods as well
as address inconsistencies in the correlations between export prices and firm
size.
5The non-unimodal distribution in many sectors cannot be explained with income dif-
ferences across exporting economies. There are 44 single-country single-sector cases when
the null-hypothesis of unimodality was rejected using Hartigan’s dip test. Single countries
export goods with a wide variety of quality to the U.S.
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3 The Closed Economy
In this section, we extend the heterogeneous firm models of Kugler and Ver-
hoogen (2012) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) by incorporating an en-
dogenous quality choice of an intermediate good for a closed economy. Our
variant incorporates quality complementarity with the limitation of two dis-
crete input quality choices.
3.1 Demand
The preferences of a representative consumer are given by a standard C.E.S.










where Ω represents the mass of available final goods. The parameter σ cap-
tures the elasticity of substitution between varieties and is assumed to be
greater than one, σ > 1. The quality of variety ω is denoted by q(ω) and
x(ω) is the quantity of good ω consumed. Following Hallak (2006), the inten-
sity of consumers’ desire for quality is given by δ. If δ = 0, the model reverts
back to a standard Melitz formulation since consumers do not value quality
differences and therefore all firms would choose the lower cost intermediate
input. Following Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), we interpret product quality
as any attribute that the representative consumer values in a differentiated
good.










where p(ω) is the price of variety ω. From the maximization problem, we
have a constant elasticity of demand function for any variety produced:
x(ω) = Aq(ω)δ(σ−1)p(ω)−σ, (3)
where A = IP σ−1 and I denotes aggregate income.
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3.2 Production
We assume an inelastic labor supply, denoted by L, earning a common wage
that is normalized to one. There are two sectors: an intermediate input
sector and a final goods sector with differentiated varieties.
The intermediate input sector produces inputs of two types of quality,
indexed by κ = {L,H} for low and high, respectively, under perfect com-
petition.6 The production function for a given quality κ is given by the








where lκI is the amount of labor producing input goods of quality κ and
1/θκ is labor productivity. Producing a low-quality intermediate input is
assumed to entail lower costs than producing a high-quality intermediate
input. Since what matters is the relative productivity of the two types of
input goods, we normalize the labor productivity of low-quality inputs to
one. Moreover, the labor productivity of high-quality inputs is assumed to
be smaller, 1/θH < 1/θL = 1. We follow Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) by
assuming that final goods producers are price-takers and the price of the
intermediate input equal the marginal cost of production: pH = θH > 1 and
pL = θL = 1.
Production in the final goods sector is characterized by two functions:
one describing the production of physical output and the other describing the
quality of the final good produced. Like in Melitz (2003), there is a continuum
of firms producing physical output under monopolistic competition, each
producing a different variety represented by subscript i. Firms combine labor










where li represents labor employed and x
κ
Ii is the quantity of intermediate
input of quality κ used by the firm. Like in Nocco (2012), α ∈ (0, 1) is the
intermediate input share and represents a measure of the strength of vertical
6The assumption of only two quality levels is a simplification to better demonstrate
the effect of the Leontief-type production function of the final good quality. See Rogerson
(1983) and Kranton (2003) for other models that differentiate between high- and low-
quality producers.
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linkages. Stronger vertical linkages in a sector implies that intermediate
inputs are more important in the production of the final good. It can also be
seen as a measure of product complexity. Complex products feature a higher
number of intermediate inputs relative to labor in production.
Firms differ in their capabilities indexed by λi ∈ (0, 1].7 This capability
parameter represents a firm’s ability to implement the intermediate input in
the production process. This can be interpreted as the quality of the firm’s
blueprint, design, self-produced parts, assembly, etc. Higher capabilities are






where β represents the elasticity of quality, as it is referred to in Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011), and pκ is the price of intermediate input quality κ = {L,H}.
Setting β = 0 reduces the model to the standard heterogeneous firm trade
model with firms being sorted by exogenous quality differences. We follow
the empirical evidence provided by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and assume
firms producing higher quality goods have higher marginal cost, all else equal,
which implies that β > 0. marginal cost are also affected by the choice
of intermediate input quality by each firm. Sectors with stronger vertical
linkages, α, will tend to have larger cost discrepancies between firms that
employ low-quality and high-quality intermediate inputs.
With CES preferences, firms will choose the same profit maximizing











κ)α(1−σ) − FP , (8)
where B = (1/σ−1)(σ−1/σ)σ[αα(1 − α)1−α]σ−1A and FP is a fixed production
cost. Following Falvey et al. (2005), A and B represent market size and the
7Melitz (2003) refers to this parameter as productivity, while models with quality het-
erogeneity across firms differ in its denotation. We follow Sutton (2007) and Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012) and interpret λi as capability in order to account for its effect on both
production cost and output quality.
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extent of competition and are taken as given by individual firms. Firms that
have higher quality goods, qi, or lower marginal cost (lower λi) will earn
higher profits, all else equal.
3.3 Output Quality and Input Choice









where λkI is the quality of the intermediate input chosen by firm i and it is
assumed that 0 < λLI < λ
H
I < 1.
Capability, λi, and intermediate input quality, λ
k
I , are perfect comple-
ments in generating output quality, qi. This follows the O-ring theory by
Kremer (1993) by assuming that the representative consumer values the qual-
ity of the final product by the lowest quality component, the quality of the
intermediate input or the quality of the production process. Figure 2 shows
how output quality varies over the range λi ∈ [0, 1], where λ̂ is the firm that
is indifferent between using the low and high-quality input.8 A final product
generated by a high-quality production process (high λi) will be perceived as
low-quality product if it contains a low-quality intermediate input. Similarly,
a high-quality input in a low-quality production process will not improve the
final product’s quality perceived by the representative consumer.
Choosing a high-quality intermediate input can potentially increase the
demand for a particular variety but also will increase the firm’s marginal
cost. The capability parameter must be larger than the low-quality input
level for a firm to benefit from choosing the high-quality input. The input
choice is characterized by the capability threshold, λ̂, and is derived by equal-




δ λLI . (10)
Firms with a capability parameter equal to the threshold capability level, λ̂,
are indifferent in their input quality choice. Firms with a higher capability







µ , does not qualitatively alter results but makes the model less tractable.
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parameter than the threshold level (λi > λ̂) will choose the high-quality
input. An increase in the price of the high-quality input, pHI , or an increase
in the perceived quality of the low-quality input, λLI , will increase the quality
threshold, λ̂.9
3.4 Firm Entry and Exit
As in Melitz (2003), there is a continuum of prospective entrants into the final
goods sector. Each firm has to make an irreversible investment of FE > 0 to
enter the market. Only after entry do firms discover their capability, λi, from
a uniform ex ante distribution, g(λ). The distribution has positive support
over (0, 1] and has a continuous cumulative distribution, G(λ) = λ/λmax, where
λmax is normalized to 1. Upon entry, a firm will decide to stay or exit the
industry depending on whether the capability draw allows operating profits
to be non-negative. We let λ∗ denote the cutoff level for the firm with the






In that case, all firms will use the low-quality input, resulting in a unimodal profit distri-
bution across firms.
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lowest capability for which π = 0:
π(λ∗) = B(q(λ∗))δ(σ−1)(λ∗)β(1−σ) − FP = 0. (11)
Since firms with a lower capability draw than the cutoff level, λ∗, will not
generate operating profits, they will exit the market. Firms with a higher
capability draw may operate in the industry. For the remainder of this paper,
we consider the more interesting case of the cutoff level being smaller than the
low input quality (λ∗ < λLi ) and the existence of only one cutoff.
10 Combining
equations (9) and (11), we find the Zero Cutoff Profit Condition to be:
π(λ∗) = B(λ∗)(δ−β)(σ−1) − FP = 0. (12)
And solving for B as a function of the cutoff capability, we have:
B = FP (λ
∗)(δ−β)(1−σ). (13)













There are two opposing effects of a firm’s capability on its profits. The
higher a firm’s capability draw, the higher their marginal cost. On the other
hand, a higher capability draw can lead to higher output quality valued by
consumers and greater demand. In contrast to other models, the final output
quality may depend on input quality. Equation (9) lets us define four profit





































FP if λi ∈ [λHI , 1),
(15)
where Ψ = (σ − 1)(δ − β) and Γ = β(1− σ) < 0.
10Up to four cutoff levels may be possible when 0 < β < δ. All possible types of
distribution are discussed in Appendix A.
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3.5 Equilibrium
Since firms are free to enter the market, they will continue to enter until
expected profits, net of entry costs, are driven to zero, E(π) = FE. From



















































Equation (16) determines the cutoff capability level, λ∗ < λLI , when it is the
unique cutoff.
In the extreme case where the capability draw does not affect a firm’s
marginal cost, β = 0, profits increase with output quality as shown in Figure
3. For low-quality producers, profits increase with the capability draw as
long as λi < λ
L
I and remains constant over the range between λ
L
I and λ̂ as
the quality of the final good does not change. Similarly, for high-quality
producers profits increase for λi < λ
H
I . When the capability draw exceeds
λHI , profits once again remain constant as output quality does not change.
The more interesting case is when β ∈ (0, δ). A higher capability draw
increases marginal cost, reducing firm profits. Output quality increases in
the capability parameter if λ ∈ [λ∗, λLI ) and λ ∈ [λ̂, λHI ). Since Ψ > 0, we
have ∂π/∂λi > 0 over those ranges.11 For λ ∈ [λLI , λ̂) or λ ∈ [λHI , 1), profits are
decreasing with firm capability, ∂πi/∂λi < 0, given that Γ < 0. The increase
of marginal cost cannot be compensated by an increase in output quality.
The result is a bimodal profit distribution, as shown in Figure 4. For the
remainder of the paper, we will focus on the more interesting case where
β ∈ (0, δ) is assumed.
11If β > δ, the exponent Ψ turns negative such that ∂πi/∂λi > 0 for all λi. If β = δ,
the profit increase from higher capability cancels out with higher marginal cost when
λ ∈ [λ∗, λLI ) and λ ∈ [λ̂, λHI ).
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Figure 4: Profits over capability parameter β ∈ (0, δ)
- λi
6




In contrast to other quality-heterogeneous firms models, we do not find
firms to be more profitable with higher capability. Instead, firms with a ca-
pability draw close to their chosen input quality are the most profitable. The
firms with the highest capability tend to be smaller and less profitable. This
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view is supported by the findings of Holmes and Stevens (2014) who analyzed
the North Carolina wood furniture industry. Large plants typically specialize
on a high degree of standardization with mass-production techniques while
small firms employ skilled labor to craft specialty products that are of higher
quality and command a higher price.
3.6 Intermediate Input Quality
In contrast to Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) where they assume a continuum
of intermediate input quality levels, we limit the number of intermediate in-
put quality levels, λκI , to a binary choice between low-quality and high-quality
inputs. This limitation to discrete quality levels is an important aspect of
our model. Firms will often have the choice between a limited number of
suppliers offering discrete quality levels of intermediate goods. This may be
interpreted as firms producing different goods that share identical inputs.12
The shape of the profit curve is affected by the location of the input
quality levels, where 0 < λLI < λ
H
I < 1. An increase in λ
L
I increases both the
cutoff level, λ∗, and the threshold level, λ̂. Firms with the lowest capability
draw lose market share to other low-quality firms due to the increase in their
final output quality. Furthermore, previous high-quality producers may find
it more profitable to reduce their marginal cost by choosing the new low-
quality input. Resources and market share shift to low-quality producers,
reducing profits of high-quality producers and forcing firms with the lowest
capability to exit.
An increase in λHI , meanwhile, increases profits of all high-quality pro-
ducers without affecting the threshold level, λ̂. This reduces profits of all
low-quality producers, forcing the least capable firms to exit the market and
increasing the cutoff level, λ∗. The gap between both intermediate input
quality levels also affects the shape of the profit curve. The smaller the gap
12We argue that in sectors with a non-unimodal distribution of output quality, there
may be a continuum of input quality for a number of intermediate inputs. However, some
intermediate inputs required for the production of the final good may be produced by
a limited number of specialized suppliers. Thus, these intermediate inputs may only be
available in a limited number of discrete quality levels. (As an example we considered
the smart phone market in 2015, when high-cost phones prominently featured scratch-
resistant glass that was rarely implemented in low-cost phones.) Then, firms would match
their input quality choice of intermediate inputs from a continuum of quality with the
distinct quality levels. Therefore, all used intermediate inputs share the same quality that
is determined by discrete quality levels.
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between λLI and λ
H
I , the more the distribution of profits appear unimodal
and the variance of quality decreases. Increasing the gap strengthens the
bimodal shape and increases the variance of quality among producing firms.
3.7 Demand for Quality and Vertical Linkages
In contrast to the model in Melitz (2003), the equilibrium production cutoff
is not the only indicator of industry structure and the highest profits are not
generated by firms with the highest productivity. The shape of the profit
curve is determined by three parameters. The demand side is represented by
the intensity of consumers’ desire for quality, δ. If δ = 0, the model falls back
to the Melitz setup. If δ > β > 0, the profit distribution becomes bimodal
because there is higher demand for high-quality products. Firms that use
high-quality intermediate inputs become more profitable when the demand
for high-quality goods increases.
The supply side is represented by the sector-specific degree of vertical
linkage, α, and the price of the high-quality intermediate input, pH . The
more complex a product, represented by the strength of vertical linkages, the
more inputs are required to produce the final good. If α = 0, the model falls
back to the setup of Baldwin and Harrigan (2011). A higher degree of vertical
linkages leads to higher intermediate input requirements in the production
process and, thus, the marginal cost in (6) increases only for firms using
high-quality inputs. Therefore, the higher the degree of vertical linkages,
the lower the profit of firms using high-quality inputs. The price of the high-
quality intermediate input, pH , can be thought of as being related to the level
of development. The less developed an economy, the lower the technology
and the labor productivity, 1/θH, in producing higher-quality inputs. Higher
prices for the high-quality input leads to lower profits of high-quality firms.
The effect of changes in any one of these parameters is shown in Figure 5.
In a closed economy, the degree of vertical linkage and the price of the
high-quality intermediate input have opposite effects on the firm profit dis-
tribution compared to the intensity of consumers’ demand for quality. If we
consider a sector with strong vertical linkages, the higher α, the larger the
share of intermediate goods in the production costs. Therefore, firms using
high-quality intermediate inputs face higher production costs and generate
lower profits in a sector with strong vertical linkages. While vertical linkages
are sector-specific, the price of the high-quality intermediate input can be
considered country-specific. The less developed an economy, the higher is
18
Figure 5: Change in profits due to decrease in quality demand, increase in
the price of the high-quality input, or strengthening of vertical linkages
π(λ)
λi




the price of high-quality intermediate inputs. Thus, firm producing high-
quality goods would be less profitable in less developed economies.
Following Linder (1961), Fan (2005), and Hallak (2006) and assuming that
consumers’ demand for quality increases with income, we have that in a low-
income country, firms using high-quality intermediate inputs generate lower
profits and have smaller market shares relative to high-quality firms in a high-
income country. As a result, high-income countries would tend to specialize
in high-quality products and low-income countries would tend to specialize
in low-quality products. This is consistent with the empirical findings in
Schott (2004), who assigns higher quality to higher unit price values, and
Khandelwal (2010), who assigns higher quality to a larger product market
share conditional on the price. Since the intensity of consumers’ demand for
quality and the price of the high-quality intermediate input correlate with
income, the model predicts that high-quality firms in rich economies would
be more profitable relative to those in poorer economies. This effect would
be stronger in sectors with strong vertical linkages.
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4 The Open Economy
In this section, we allow for trade between two symmetric economies. This
symmetry implies that wages will be equalized across the countries.
If we were to assume that there are no trade costs on exported differen-
tiated products, all firms will sell their products in both markets and face
identical costs and demand. In this case, two open economies can be mod-
eled as a closed economy with an increase in country size, L. As in Melitz
(2003), there is no effect on firm level outcome. The capability cutoff, capa-
bility threshold, and profit function would all stay the same while the mass
of firms will increase proportionally to the increase in country size L.
Assuming the existence of trade costs in the final goods sector will only
allow a subset of firms to increase their profits by exporting. Trade costs
are modeled as per-unit iceberg trade costs, τ > 1, where τ units of the
final good must be shipped for every unit sold at its destination, as well as
a fixed export cost, FX > FP . Iceberg trade costs increase the marginal cost





1−σ(pκ)α(1−σ) − FX , (17)
where πiX(λ) are profits from exporting. Setting exporting profits equal to
zero (πiX = 0) and using equation (13) to substitute for B, we can derive























τ 1−σ(pκ)α(1−σ)FP − FX . (19)
4.1 Multiple Export Cutoffs
When β ∈ (0, δ), there may exist up to four export cutoffs. Due to the as-
sumption that trade costs are relatively larger than the overhead production
costs (τ (σ−1)FX > FP ), there are fewer firms exporting than serving the do-
mestic market. We derive these four potential export cutoff levels by solving


















































β if λi ∈ [λHI , 1).
(20)
The first export cutoff level, λ∗X1, exists iff πX(λ
L
I ) > 0. If the most profitable
low-quality firm (λLI ) exports, then λ
∗
X1 > λ
∗ exists. The second export
cutoff level, λ∗X2, exists iff πX(λ
L
I ) > 0 and πX(λ̂) < 0. In this case, there
are low-quality exporters but firms that are indifferent between using low
or high-quality inputs only serve the domestic market. The third export
cutoff, λ∗X3, exists iff πX(λ
H
I ) > 0 and πX(λ̂) < 0. There are high-quality
exporters using high-quality inputs and, similarly to the second export cutoff,
firms indifferent between low and high-quality inputs only serve the domestic




X3 cannot exist. Finally, the
fourth export cutoff, λ∗X4, only exists if πX(λ
H
I ) > 0 and πX(1) < 0. There
are firms profitably exporting goods with high-quality inputs but firms with
the highest capability draw only serve the domestic market.13
4.2 Equilibrium
Similarly to the closed economy, we determine the production cutoff level,
λ∗, by setting expected profits equal to zero. In an open economy, expected
profits are larger if firms are allowed to export. We determine expected profits
in an open economy by combining expected profits in a closed economy,
πD(λ), from (16) and add expected profits of exporters, πX(λ):
13Appendix B graphically shows the firm distributions for all potential cases when τ > 1


























































As in Melitz (2003), compared to a closed economy, all firms incur a loss in
domestic sales when we allow for bilateral trade. Only exporting firms can
increase their sales, leading to higher revenues and a larger market share.
Similarly, non-exporting firms incur a loss in profits. This leads to a rise in
the cutoff level, λ∗, in an open economy compared to a closed economy. The
least profitable firms, with a capability draw near the production cutoff in
a closed economy, do not generate profits in an open economy and exit the
market.14
Exporting firms generate higher sales but face additional trade costs.
Therefore, many exporters will also incur a profit loss if their gains in ex-
porting sales are not sufficient to counter the loss of profits from domestic
sales. The subset of exporting firms with quality draws near their chosen
input quality will be able to increase their profits from trade. This results in
a new profit distribution as shown in Figure 6.
We refer to this result as quality polarization: a reallocation of market
share and resources towards the modes of the distribution due to a change
14The least profitable firms may also be located around the capability threshold level,
λ̂, and the maximum capability draw, λmax. Their profit loss due to trade may be so high
that they also exit the domestic market and multiple production cutoff levels are created,
as shown in Appendix A. This shows that opening up for trade may also negatively impact
on some high-quality producers.
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Figure 6: Quality polarization
π(λ)
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from autarky to free trade. Quality polarization strengthens previously ex-
isting patterns of quality and market share in a closed economy. The range
of produced varieties declines and the range of traded varieties increases.
Traded goods are characterized by a range of product quality that is
a fraction of the total range of quality produced in the domestic market.
This may explain the differences in empirical evidence about the correlation
between prices and firms size in trade data. While a wide range of quality
might be produced within an economy, exported goods are allocated around
the modes of the profit distribution. We identify eight possible cases in
Appendix B that describe open economy equilibria with different ranges of
quality of exported goods. If there exist only low-quality exporters, trade
data would suggest a negative correlation between export prices and firm size.
If there are only high-quality exporters, the correlation would be positive. In
other cases with the presence of both high- and low-quality exporting firms,
the correlation would be ambiguous and depend on the mass of firms in each
group.
In previous heterogeneous firms trade models, the correlation between
price and firm size in trade data has been explained with exporters having a
larger market share than non-exporting firms. When β ∈ (0, δ), we find that
the input quality choice affects the market share of firms as well. Holding
profits equal, firms that use high-quality intermediate inputs have a smaller
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market share than firms that choose low-quality intermediate inputs due to
the higher price they charge not being offset by the higher demand for quality.
Choosing an equal input quality level, more profitable firms have a larger
market share. The effect of input quality on market share strengthens with
the price of the high-quality intermediate input and the degree of vertical
linkages, α. Therefore, we expect high-quality firms to be smaller in sectors
with high product complexity or in less developed economies.
Like Foster et al. (2008), we find that firms self-select to export by their
profitability that is, in turn, determined by the characteristics of the indus-
try and the economy, as shown in Section 3. This aspect is equal to the
findings by Antoniades (2015) which explains inconsistencies in trade data
with sector-specific variations in the scope for quality differentiation. How-
ever, our approach can not only explain the inconsistencies in the trade data
across sectors but can also explain the presence of bimodal distributions of
quality in some sectors. Furthermore, income differences across countries,
which can affect consumer quality preferences, may explain why high-income
countries tend to produce goods with higher quality and higher complexity,
as found in Kremer (1993).
4.4 Trade Liberalization
Following Melitz (2003), we investigate the effect of trade liberalization through
a reduction in trade costs. The notation of the open economy remains and
we add primes (′) to all variables in the new equilibrium.
A decrease in trade costs to τ ′ < τ induces a reduction of the export
cutoffs λ∗X1 and λ
∗





Simultaneously, the production cutoff, λ∗, increases to λ∗′. The increased
exposure to trade forces the least profitable firms to exit while allowing more
firms to export. All firms incur a loss in domestic sales and firms that do
not export earn less profit. The decrease in profits for non-exporters may
generate additional production cutoffs (see Appendix A). In this case, high-
quality firms that either charge too high a price or produce very low quality
do not generate profits and exit the market. Exporting firms increase their
revenue through international sales. The most profitable of these firms are
able to earn higher profits.
The production and export cutoffs are similarly affected by a decrease
in the fixed export cost, FX . Domestic firms face stronger competition due
to importing firms and the least profitable firms leave the market (λ∗ rises).
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New firms enter the export market, resulting in smaller changes in the export
cutoffs as described when iceberg trade cost are reduced. However, a decrease
in FX will not increase the market share or profits of already exporting
firms. The market share of existing firms are reallocated to firms who find it
profitable to export. The change in quality polarization is only caused by a
selection effect of firms entering the export market.
Trade liberalization increases the degree of quality polarization. Domestic
firms produce over a smaller range of quality and the range of quality of
exporting firms increases with reductions in trade costs. The market share
and profits of the most profitable firms increase while the least profitable
firms exit the market.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine inconsistencies in trade data regarding the cor-
relation between output price and market share of traded goods. Previous
research found this correlation to be positive in some sectors and negative
in others. This lead to the development of two alternative explanations in
theoretical literature: either the most productive or the highest output qual-
ity firms export. We draw from a rich data set of U.S. imports collected
and aggregated by Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) and find the distribution of
quality to be bimodal in 14 of 25 sectors with over 1,000 observations at the
HS 6-digit classification. This evidence suggests that firms find it profitable
to export different quality levels within sectors.
We address these findings by extending the heterogeneous firms trade
model of Melitz (2003) with endogenous quality choice and quality comple-
mentarity inspired by the O-ring theory by Kremer (1993). Output quality
is determined in a Leontief-type production function with the quality of the
intermediate input and a firm specific quality parameter serving as inputs.
Firms have a binary choice between two quality levels of intermediate inputs.
When β ∈ (0, δ), firm profits increase with capability until output quality
stagnates due to perfect complementarity. Profits then decline with capabil-
ity since marginal cost continue to increase while the output price does not.
We derive a threshold level above which firms find it profitable to switch to
the high-quality intermediate input. The resulting distribution of profits is
bimodal.
We find the intensity of consumers’ desire for quality, product complexity,
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and the economy’s technology to determine the shape of the distribution of
profits. This paper examines two symmetric open economies. Firms displace
less profitable but not necessarily less productive or lower quality businesses.
Trade liberalization leads to quality polarization, a reallocation of market
share and resources towards the modes of the profit distribution. Thus,
empirical findings may be explained by the variable that determined the
shape of the distribution of profits.
We conclude with a caveat about the trade model. Allowing trade be-
tween symmetric countries leads to a tractable model. In the real world,
countries differ in labor productivity as well as in preferences for quality. We
touch on how differences in income and technology affect the equilibrium be-
tween symmetric countries. A straightforward extension of the model would
be the introduction of asymmetric countries in order to examine how income
and productivity differences affect observed patterns of trade.
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Appendix A Multiple Production Cutoffs
In the case of β ∈ (0, δ), there exists the possibility of up to four production
cutoffs. This may happen if firms with a capability draw equal to the capa-
bility threshold (λi = λ̂) or equal to the maximum capability (λi = λ
max)
generate no profits. In this case, firms choose not to produce and exit the
domestic market. The three additional production cutoff levels are derived
by setting profits from equation (14) equal to zero for the capability ranges




















β if λi ∈ [λHI , 1).
(22)
There are seven different possible cases for the existence of the production
cutoff levels in a closed economy as shown in Figure 7. In Figure 7a there is
the standard case used in this paper with only one production cutoff, λ∗. In
Figure 7b, least productive firms that use high-quality inputs exit the market
so that there exist the cutoff level λ∗ and λ∗4. In Figures 7c and 7d firms with
a capability draw equal to the threshold level, λ̂, do not generate profits and
exit the market while both low-quality and high-quality inputs using firms
exist. Therefore, there we can also find the cutoff levels λ∗2 and λ
∗
3. In Figures
7e and 7f there are only firms that use high-quality inputs. This eliminates
the existence of the first two production cutoff levels λ∗ and λ∗1. And, finally,
in Figure 7f there are only low-quality input firms so that only firms with
a capability draw between the first two production cutoff levels λ∗ and λ∗1
generate profits.
It is crucial to identify which case applies to an economy for determining
the equilibrium. The free entry condition from section 3.5 is modeled after
the simplest case shown in Figure 7a. Equation (16) must be altered in
each of the other six cases. Additional production cutoff levels can also be
created by opening up for trade. If firms with a capability draw equal to the
threshold level, λ̂, or maximum capability level, λmax, do not export, their
market share and profits will decline. The incurred profit loss can be so large
that a firm exits the domestic market.
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Figure 7: Seven closed economy cases
-λi
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(g) Two low-quality cutoffs
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Appendix B Potential Export Cases
As shown in Figure 8, there are eight different possible cases in an open
economy. In Figure 8a, trade costs are too large for any firm to export
profitably. In Figure 8b, only firms using low-quality intermediate inputs are
exporting (πX(λ
L
I ) > 0) so that there exist the two export cutoff levels λ
∗
X1
and λ∗X2. In Figures 8c and 8d, only firms using the high-quality intermediate
input are exporters. In the first figure, there exist the two export cutoff levels
λ∗X3 and λ
∗
X4. In the former we find πX(1) > 0 and, therefore, firms of the
whole range of λ ∈ (λHI , 1) export profitably.
In Figures 8e and 8f, there are two ranges of firms exporting, each a pro-
portion of firms using either high-quality or low-quality intermediate inputs.
Therefore, all four export cutoff levels exist, though in the second figure we
find all firms across the range of λ ∈ (λHI , 1) exporting as in Figure 8d. In the
last two Figures 8g and 8h, there is one range of exporting firms across both
input quality choices. In Figure 8g, we find the first and fourth export cutoff
levels λ∗X1 and λ
∗
X4. In the last figure, all exporting firms have a capability
draw that is higher than the first export cutoff.
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(h) One range of exporters (2)
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